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‘You try to be a fair employer’: Regulation and employment relationships in 
medium-sized firms 
Abstract 
In this article, we explore the dynamic, indirect effects of employment regulation 
through a qualitative study of three medium-sized enterprises and their ongoing, 
everyday employment relationships. We analyse how employment regulation is enacted 
through employment relationships and how its effects are negotiated by owner-
managers and employees. Whereas owner-manager prerogative is generally associated 
with informality in small and medium-sized enterprises, we identify instances of formal 
policies and procedures implemented in response to regulation being instrumental in 
exerting this prerogative. Further, employees reinforced this process by making 
judgements regarding the employment relationship in terms of their perceived, informal 
psychological contract rather than external regulatory obligations. This article extends 
understanding of dynamic, indirect regulatory effects in relation to the interplay of 
informality and formality within psychological contracts in medium-sized enterprises. 
Keywords 
Medium-sized enterprises, employment relationships, regulation, psychological contract 
  
Introduction 
Business regulation represents an attempt by governments and other bodies to influence 
or control organisational practices; for example, in maintaining open markets but also in 
areas such as protecting employee rights. Such attempts have received particular 
attention in relation to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (Kitching, 2006; 
Westrip, 1986) where they have become tied to the dominant political narrative of 
enterprise and business growth (Perren and Jennings, 2005). In this context, regulation 
is frequently considered as over-complicated, unnecessary and burdensome, with these 
problems falling disproportionately upon SMEs (Edwards et al., 2004; Young, 2012). 
However, the effects of regulation on these firms, which can take dynamic and indirect 
forms, merits further critical consideration (Barrett et al., 2014; Kitching et al., 2013a, 
2013b). Our exploratory research therefore set out to gain insights into how regulation 
influences medium-sized firms in dynamic and indirect ways, with a particular focus on 
employment regulation. 
In addition to the operating contexts and competing external influences upon firms such 
as market forces (Barrett and Rainnie, 2002), the effects of regulation should be 
understood in terms of what is happening inside the firm since neither owner-managers 
nor their employees are passive recipients of such influences (Ram, 1994). To explore 
this internal negotiation and adaptation, we present empirical material from qualitative, 
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semi-structured research interviews across three medium-sized enterprises. Our findings 
illustrate that compliance with regulation does not necessarily constrain the exercise of 
informal management prerogative, but rather alters how it is exercised. Further, 
employees apply a broad sense of the psychological contract to evaluate the 
employment relationship and management in their firms, only rarely referring to 
specific external regulatory provisions. The interpretive insights that emerge from these 
findings aid the conceptual development of the psychological contract in the specific 
context of medium-sized enterprises in terms of the interplay between formal and 
informal elements of the employment relationship. It is through this development of the 
psychological contract that we further understanding of the dynamic, indirect effects of 
regulation within these firms. 
To critically explore our research question, this article is structured as follows: the 
literature analysis locates our work in the debates surrounding the regulatory context of 
SMEs and the psychological contract as a valuable approach to understanding 
employment relationships in these firms. The methodology then sets out how the 
empirical materials were generated and analysed, followed by a presentation of the key 
findings on a firm-by-firm basis. Our discussion develops insights into dynamic, 
indirect regulatory effects in relation to the interplay of informality and formality within 
psychological contracts in medium-sized enterprises. The paper concludes by outlining 
the implications and limitations of our work along with opportunities for further 
  
research. 
Literature Analysis 
Firms relate, by degrees, to a regulatory context that, as well as supporting the markets 
in which they operate (Kitching et al., 2013a), may also seek to reduce or constrain 
owner-manager prerogative and influence employment relationships, for example 
through a minimum wage or working time regulations (Arrowsmith et al., 2003; 
Marlow, 2003). However, in the neoliberal discourse of economic growth, within which 
a prominent place is given to SMEs, regulation has been framed as inhibiting their 
ability to operate and is considered a burden (Barrett et al., 2014). In response, 
governments such as that of the UK seek ‘to reduce the number of unnecessary 
regulations that hold back businesses while ensuring that both workers and the public 
are protected’ (BIS, 2013). However, it is difficult to identify what effects regulations 
actually have or to link the mandates and prohibitions to particular business outcomes 
(Edwards et al., 2004; Kitching, 2006). Instead, there is a need to adopt a more nuanced, 
dynamic understanding of regulation and SMEs. 
Further, there is a need to recognise the distinctive contexts of those organisations 
typically grouped under the ‘SME’ banner. Sectoral considerations aside (Arrowsmith et 
al., 2003), the challenges and responses one might encounter in a small business could 
differ from those found in medium-sized enterprises that may retain a degree of owner-
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manager control and informality (Mallett and Wapshott, 2014) while also possessing a 
greater degree of formality (Kotey and Sheridan, 2004). This coexistence of informality 
and formality provides interesting sites in which to explore how regulation is enacted 
through employment relationships (Marlow, 2003). However, a focus on medium-sized 
firms also provides difficulties in relating to the existing literature where small and 
medium-sized enterprises are rarely treated as distinct. Despite this limitation, taking the 
field as we find it permits engagement with regulatory issues discussed in the literature, 
while our empirical material speaks specifically to the experiences of medium-sized 
enterprises. 
The regulatory context of SMEs 
SMEs, broadly defined as those with up to 249 employees (ONS, 2013), are often 
considered as highly context-sensitive (Barrett et al., 2014) and to be dominated 
internally by the interests and goals of owner-managers (Marlow, 2005). Even as such 
firms adopt formal policies, often to accompany growth (Phelps et al., 2007), owner-
managers frequently retain preferences for informal and individualised practices (Hoque 
and Noon, 2004; Mallett and Wapshott, 2014), which can contribute to a higher 
incidence of employment tribunal applications (Saridakis et al., 2008). Viewed as 
dominant influences within their firms, owner-managers are, therefore, often the target 
of regulatory interventions, debates and research projects. 
  
Commonly cited objections to regulations include compliance costs associated with 
understanding and adapting to new rules and obligations (Smallbone and Welter, 2001) 
and affinity costs where regulatory compliance requires accompanying changes 
(Edwards et al., 2004), often without the necessary resources or expertise of in-house 
HR professionals (Harris, 2002; Hart and Blackburn, 2005). Further, owner-managers 
generally express a dislike for any measures that interfere with their managerial 
prerogative as employers (Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; Westrip, 1986). Accordingly, 
firms may avoid growth through outsourcing to avoid the regulatory obligations and 
scrutiny associated with the employment relationship (Bischoff and Wood, 2013; 
Perraudin et al., 2013). 
However, studies into the effects of regulation on SMEs suggest that its role in day-to-
day operations may be overstated and more nuanced than business lobby groups suggest 
(Carter et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2004; Westrip, 1986). Owner-manager 
understanding is often vague on the details of employment regulations (Hart and 
Blackburn, 2005; Marlow, 2003) and, while they express general dissatisfaction with 
regulatory conditions, relatively few report being affected by specific provisions 
(Atkinson and Curtis, 2004; Carter et al., 2009). This may derive, in part, from the 
dominant socio-historical discourses around the burdens of regulation but also those that 
construct SMEs as unlikely to comply with these regulations (Barrett et al., 2014). 
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In practice, the situation may be more complicated than is often presented. Kitching et 
al., (2013a: 7) argue that ‘there is no typical “small business effect” of regulation; 
outcomes vary over time, contingent on the agency of small businesses and their 
stakeholders’. Particular regulations, and how they are interpreted, will affect businesses 
in different ways owing to differences in firm size, age and sector (Arrowsmith et al., 
2003; Hart and Blackburn, 2005; Morris et al., 2005) as well as to competitive 
conditions, degrees of regulatory enforcement and the responses of others in the firm’s 
external and internal environments (Harris, 2000; Kitching, 2006). This creates a range 
of particular understandings of how given sets of regulations may apply to an 
organisation with owner-manager understanding often negotiated, drawing on a variety 
of sources such as external advisors, customers and employees (Kitching, 2006). Not all 
regulatory effects will be perceived or understood by owner-managers who are, for 
example, less likely to acknowledge any enabling effects (Kitching et al., 2013b). 
Further, we should not overlook the importance of employees in influencing how 
regulations may impact upon organisational practice. For example, highly-skilled 
workers might exert additional, informal pressure on their employers to secure their 
rights and interests (Bacon and Hoque, 2005; Wapshott and Mallett, 2013). However, 
even the highly skilled may have little awareness of their legal rights (Bacon and 
Hoque, 2005) so, while regulatory non-compliance by owner-managers can negatively 
impact employee views of the employment relationship (NACAB, 2000), it does not 
  
necessarily lead to explicit action to enforce employment rights (Ram et al., 2007). To 
encompass these internal forces and the potential for negotiation, this paper will focus 
predominantly on employment regulation. 
Taking a process perspective (Harris, 2000) highlights how the effects of employment 
regulation are influenced by a range of factors including ‘the nature of different laws, 
the mediating effect of competitive conditions, and the context of relationships inside 
small firms’ (Edwards et al., 2004: 247). Discussing the effect of regulation is too crude; 
the effects of regulation are dynamic, positive and negative, direct and indirect 
(Kitching et al., 2013a) and businesses of similar size cannot be assumed to be 
homogeneous (Burrows and Curran, 1989; Rainnie, 1991). Further, regulatory effects 
need to be understood not only in terms of formal contracts and policies but also the 
day-to-day informal employment relationship and individual perceptions of the 
psychological contract. 
The psychological contract in SMEs 
The close physical proximity and interpersonal contact that breeds high degrees of 
informality in SMEs (Bacon and Hoque, 2005; Ram and Edwards, 2003) involves 
improvised, ad hoc solutions and compromises, producing or adopting formal policies 
and procedures but also unwritten practices, routines and tacit understandings (Brown et 
al., 2010; Ram et al., 2001). Therefore, even as firms grow and attempt to formalise 
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(Phelps et al., 2007), degrees of informality remain an important part of everyday 
employment relationships (Mallett and Wapshott, 2014). Different degrees of 
(in)formality may be deployed in response to particular internal and external demands 
and, instead of a competing duality, informality and formality can be considered as 
coexistent (Marlow et al., 2010).  
This close proximity and coexistence of informality and formality produces 
interpersonal forms of negotiation and interaction where it is clear who the employer is 
and where differences in the application of policy or practice are more likely to be felt at 
an individual level (Ram, 1994). This employment relationship is interpreted like a 
contract albeit, given its intersubjective nature (Wapshott and Mallett, 2013), one liable 
to misinterpretation and breach (Guest, 1998) and likely to escape conceptualisations of 
traditional, formal contracts. The interplay between informality and formality that 
informs the negotiation and maintenance of these employment relationships in SMEs 
can therefore be best considered in terms of a psychological contract (Atkinson, 2008; 
Nadin and Cassell, 2007). 
Psychological contracts consist of the perceptions of both parties to the employment 
relationship and the reciprocal obligations implied within it (Guest and Conway, 2002). 
They are considered transactional and relational (Rousseau, 1990), where the former 
reflect obligations around pay and advancement and the latter areas such as job security 
  
and development. Relational breaches are likely to have deeper impacts than 
transactional breaches, although these differences are not always clear and are 
dependent upon context (Atkinson, 2007; Guest, 1998). SMEs represent such a context 
where psychological contracts may differ from the larger firms featured in most studies, 
for example owing to the distinct mix of close social and spatial proximity, resource 
constraints and degrees of informality and formality (Atkinson, 2008; Nadin and 
Cassell, 2007). However, there have been very few studies of psychological contracts in 
small and, especially, medium-sized enterprises and the implications of the concept are 
therefore underdeveloped in these contexts. 
There are difficulties in drawing out meaningful generalisations about SMEs given the 
context-dependent nature of the contract and the variety of employment practices 
adopted (Cassell et al., 2002). Further, some studies have focused exclusively on one 
party to the employment relationship, such as Nadin and Cassell’s (2007) study of small 
firm owner-managers which highlighted their unwillingness to make obligations 
explicit. There is also a risk in applying the psychological contract as a conceptual 
framework since, as Dick and Nadin (2011) found, it can lack relevance for some 
participants, specifically those in small firms with low-status, low-paid jobs. Partly as a 
result, the degree to which these perceived rights and obligations represent a contract is 
disputed in as much as it is not freely entered into, negotiated or agreed upon (Cullinane 
and Dundon, 2006).  
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However, this misrepresents how formal employment contracts operate in practice 
(Cullinane and Dundon, 2006; Guest, 1998) where they are infused with an informality 
that is largely unrecognised. This can take the form of (mis)interpretations, implied 
terms around fair treatment or in relation to common law rules based around sectoral 
norms (Middlemiss, 2011). This may be especially important with low-status employees 
in relatively informal, non-unionised SMEs lacking awareness of their rights 
(Arrowsmith et al., 2003) where understanding may be derived directly from employers, 
second-hand interpretations and broader socio-historical discourses, such as those 
around health and safety or part-time working (Barrett et al., 2014; Cullinane and 
Dundon, 2006; Middlemiss, 2011). As a result, managers and employees can come to 
fill in the gaps they perceive in the ambiguities of policies and HR guidance (Dick, 
2010), constructing more specific obligations and expectations. 
While recognising the psychological contract as a discursive product derived, in part, 
from broader neo-liberal discourses (Cullinane and Dundon, 2006) it can nonetheless, 
help counterbalance a purely legalistic, formal view of the employment relationship, 
embracing the importance of subjectivity and indeterminacy (Cullinane and Dundon, 
2006). The sense of contractual obligation usefully conceptualises the experiences and 
expectations of employees, especially in the more informal working environment of 
SMEs (Atkinson, 2008; Dundon and Wilkinson, 2009). While such perceived rights and 
obligations are rarely explicit and may or may not be shared (Arnold, 1996), failure to 
  
fulfil an obligation still has potentially negative consequences for the employment 
relationship (Robinson and Morrison, 2000). Accordingly, when conceptualising the 
dynamic, indirect effects of employment regulation within SMEs it is important to 
consider how it may affect psychological contracts in terms of the perceived rights and 
obligations of both employees and employers. 
Methodology 
This project began with the research question: how does regulation influence medium-
sized firms in dynamic and indirect ways? The chosen focus to explore this question is 
the internal understanding and negotiation of employment regulation in ongoing, 
everyday employment relationships. To this end we studied three quite different 
medium-sized enterprises via an in-depth, qualitative multiple-case study approach 
(Yin, 2003). The focus on medium-sized enterprises arose from an interest in the 
negotiation and interpretation of regulation in firms retaining a degree of informality 
and owner-manager control while also having formalised and introduced a range of 
employment policies and practices (Kotey and Sheridan, 2004; Marlow et al., 2010). 
These firms also provided opportunities to talk to multiple employees who may 
interpret or experience regulations and their rights and obligations differently. 
The three companies presented in this paper were selected via purposive sampling to 
identify owner-managed businesses with between 50 and 100 employees. Using a 
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university’s business contact list, access was negotiated by telephone to three firms in 
the North of England. The firms shared a relatively high degree of formalisation in 
terms of the existence of policies and procedures and their espoused approach to 
regulatory compliance. The firms were run by owner-managers, emphasising the notion 
of personalised management, and were small in comparison to their perceived 
competitors, competing in markets where large firms dominated. 
The firms were drawn from the financial services, manufacturing and information 
technology sectors. Consistent with the exploratory nature of this study, this range of 
sectors was adopted to offer scope for variety in the everyday nature of the employment 
relationships with employees possessing different levels of status, education and skills 
(Bacon and Hoque, 2005). This approach was in line with our aims not to generalise to a 
specific population but, instead, to examine the ongoing, everyday processes and 
dynamics within each case, supported by some comparisons between sectors to generate 
additional insights (Ram et al., 2001). 
Given some of the sensitive material discussed, all three firms and each participant have 
been given pseudonyms. Due to potential commercial sensitivity, gaining access to each 
firm required assurances that anonymity would be protected and only general, non-
specific company data would be published. 
 
  
Generating empirical materials 
Qualitative studies are well-suited to the complexity and messiness of regulatory effects 
but underused in relation to SMEs and, more broadly, in terms of exploring the 
psychological contract or with low-status employees (Dick and Nadin, 2011; Kitching et 
al., 2013a). Further, heeding Kitching’s (2006) warnings against focusing narrowly on 
the employer perspective upon regulation as cost or constraint, our approach 
incorporated employer and employee viewpoints to help understand the range of 
responses and to explore the different interpretations of the psychological contract. 
To explore how understandings of employment regulation were negotiated within the 
employment relationship, empirical materials were generated from documents and semi-
structured interviews. The documents were primarily in the form of employee 
handbooks and policy documents where the firms typically set out their formal 
interpretation of regulation and the employment relationship. Between 12 and 15 semi-
structured interviews were conducted in each firm, giving a total of 41 interviews. The 
interviews were held with owner-managers, managers and employees, lasting between 
30 and 60 minutes. The interviews were recorded and then transcribed verbatim to 
facilitate subsequent analysis. 
The research participants were drawn from a range of departments and hierarchical 
levels to capture a variety of experience. However, through necessity, access to 
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participants was negotiated with owner-managers and participants. In general, the 
participants in all three firms appeared willing to be part of the research process and 
most welcomed the opportunity to air their views. Their responses appeared to be frank, 
expressing a range of opinions and experiences. We will briefly describe the participants 
for each firm in the relevant sections of the findings. 
Each interview started with a general discussion of working lives before focusing in 
greater detail on the understandings of regulation and the role it played in shaping 
organisational practices and psychological contracts. This approach sought to explore 
the general perceptions of respondents regarding their everyday experiences in relation 
to a broad regulatory context, with a particular focus on employment regulation. To help 
elicit more detail, respondents were also asked to describe critical incidents (Herriot et 
al., 1997) where they or others had engaged with regulation to their benefit or detriment. 
Not all respondents were able to cite a critical incident but those accounts that were 
discussed provided a powerful means of generating insight (Purvis and Cropley, 2003) 
and, in many cases, critical incidences also emerged in more general discussions around 
participants’ working lives. These incidents were discussed in terms of what happened, 
why it happened, how it was handled and the consequences (Cope and Watts, 2000). 
Analysis 
While analysis is integral to the generation of empirical materials in an exploratory, 
  
qualitative study (Eisenhardt, 1989), the conclusion of fieldwork permitted a thorough 
process of analysis. Using NVivo software, sections of transcribed interviews and 
materials such as the employee handbook were organised by coding examples in which 
regulation was cited in relation to particular aspects of employment relationships, for 
instance prompting or constraining particular actions as well as instances of perceived 
expectations, rights or obligations. We did not create a formal coding dictionary owing 
to the inductive nature of the coding process. Instead, consistency of interpretation was 
achieved by resolving any disagreements by revisiting and discussing the empirical 
source materials until consensus was reached. 
When the coding was completed, the empirical material was organised in relation to a 
broad range of codes covering different aspects of regulation and the perceived rights 
and obligations of employees and employers. The codes and relevant extracts of 
empirical materials were analysed in light of the extant literature on employment 
relationships, the psychological contract and regulation in SMEs. As we worked through 
our analysis, we identified several key themes that represented our understanding of the 
dynamic, indirect effects of regulation within the participant firms and helped to 
generate interpretive insights. In the findings section, we present some of the key 
themes within the context of each individual firm. 
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Findings 
This section will present each business in turn to maintain the context of the particular 
sector and firm-specific details. Owing to constraints of space we cannot provide 
exhaustive details of each relevant instance without losing some of the detail and 
nuance facilitated by our qualitative approach but we have attempted to present those 
most representative of the emergent themes identified in our analysis. The three firms 
are discussed with a focus on the mix of formality and informality in the different 
contexts of each firm. Taking each firm in turn, we focus on: formal documentation, 
specifically the employee handbook; a mix of formality and informality around day-to-
day relations and health and safety compliance; and the changing role of formality in 
redundancy processes and their aftermath. 
Before discussing each firm, it is worth noting that, reflecting their relatively high 
degrees of formalisation, management in all three firms had relationships with external 
specialists who helped them ensure at least minimal compliance with regulation. As 
such, the specialists were additional partners to the employment relationship. In 
contrast, none of the employee participants were union members or had recognised 
specialists of their own to consult or direct contact with the advisers. 
InsCo 
InsCo is an insurance broker, operating in a heavily regulated, fiercely competitive 
  
market but experiencing high profitability and strong year-on-year financial growth. 
The current Chief Executive is the son of the founder, providing a consistent 
management style and exhibiting apparently harmonious employment relations. 
Interviews were conducted with 14 from around 95 employees. Interviews were held 
with the Chief Executive (owner-manager: Fred), the Managing Director, one senior and 
one middle manager, a supervisor and nine other employees from a range of insurance 
product teams. 
Fred and his employees presented themselves as striving to deliver and receiving good 
treatment, fulfilling a broad range of transactional and relational obligations in the 
employment relationship. Perhaps supported by the firm’s strong financial performance, 
many employees talked about the firm in positive terms for training delivery, bonuses, 
approach to time off and often used paternalistic phrases such as that the firm ‘looked 
after’ its employees. Participants sometimes had difficulty in providing incidents for 
discussion in terms of breach of obligations. 
Several employees described positive experiences. For example, Peter, who had been 
with the firm for a long time, explained this in relational terms: 
I can only relate to when my parents died. Apart from just the general time off 
for dependants, they were very kind and very caring they came to me and said if 
you need extra time, don’t worry. 
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Fred was broadly aware of regulatory provisions, taking advice from solicitors as 
required and indicating that employees were always afforded their rights, although he 
had little detailed knowledge of these. He suggested, however, that employment 
regulation was largely irrelevant as it was ‘30 years behind good business practice’ and 
that he would strive to offer employees more than their minimum rights: 
We certainly wouldn’t follow legislation if it didn’t suit us. And I say this in a 
positive way, if for whatever overwhelming reason we wanted to do something 
that legislation said no, we would weigh it up and probably do it anyway. 
Employee understanding of regulation was largely derived from the staff handbook. For 
example, Patricia, when asked about her understanding of employment regulations, 
replied: 
When we join we’re given a staff handbook and it’s pages and pages and I didn’t 
read through it in much detail but looked through it generally and it’s got a copy 
of all the rights that we have and there’s also a copy of that on everyone’s 
computer  
However, staff suggested the knowledge of regulation that was derived from the 
handbook, or other sources, was limited. An administrator, Emily, explained: 
I think it’s actually up to you to find out what your rights are. […] If I wanted to 
  
know about something, say maternity leave, I’d have to get the book out. I 
wouldn’t know it off by heart. […] I know what’s in the handbook, but not 
anything else 
David, the Group Administrator, illustrated how InsCo’s conception of the employment 
relationship engaged with the handbook: 
… although the staff handbook does state, I’m not entirely sure, that salary will 
be paid for the X number of months, in the past, if anybody has been off which 
has exceeded whatever the arbitrary period is before salary drops, there has 
always been a decision taken and they are always retained on full pay. They do 
look after them exceptionally well 
However, David also described the potential weaknesses in management’s approach to 
compliance: 
They allow personal preference, personal liking to colour their decisions. In my 
view, it is probably true to say that that manner of dealing with things costs them 
money in terms of paying-people-out where, in fact, we could have been more 
professional in our decision making. 
Owner-manager Fred expanded on this approach: 
… we have a fantastic sentence which goes at the end of everything, which is in 
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the staff handbook, everybody’s basic rights and legal rights are tried and at the 
end of it we have said this may be altered at the discretion of the directors. So, 
for example, the paternity leave, we just top it up to the full. [...]. But I’m not 
going to write it down that that is what we are going to do because, well, 
somebody really tried to take the mickey out of us. We want the flexibility of 
awarding it as a bonus really, so that’s the flexibility. 
While he could not think of a situation where he would withhold these rights, Fred’s 
aversion to formalising what was currently achieved via informal, relational 
arrangements was clear. Thus, at InsCo, formal documents such as the staff handbook 
filtered understanding of the regulatory context as external consultants ensured it 
maintained minimal compliance. As with the other participating firms, the handbook 
was perceived by employees as representing their full rights and obligations in an 
equitable, open manner. However, for management, the handbook was seen as a starting 
point from which they would exercise their discretion to allow rights that they perceived 
as ‘over and above’ regulatory compliance. 
SteelCo 
SteelCo is a manufacturing firm operating in a regulatory context that highlighted health 
and safety, a topic that repeatedly emerged in interviews in contractual terms, alongside 
other transactional elements of perceived rights and obligations (see also Walker and 
  
Hutton, 2006). At SteelCo, 12 interviews were carried out from a total of 65 employees. 
Interviews were held with the Managing Director (owner-manager Owen), the 
Divisional Director, the Works Manager, the Works Foreman, seven machine operatives 
and one sales person. The interviews typically lasted 30 to 60 minutes. 
The firm had retained consistent ownership but, despite previously being profitable, at 
the time of the research it was barely breaking-even with stagnant growth and operating 
within tight margins. Owen believed he treated employees well, although he felt this 
was largely not reciprocated. He had some awareness, though little detailed knowledge, 
of employment regulation and resented the increased formality that procedures to ensure 
compliance required: 
The old method, the old terminology we had was ‘smack ‘em and sack ‘em’ and 
it worked. You can’t any more. 
Owen saw key incidents relating to employment regulation in terms of issues such as 
maternity pay that were generally negotiated directly with individual staff, excluding the 
firm’s legal advisers. We quote at length to try to capture Owen’s attitude and approach 
as well as an example of the role of informal negotiation: 
The only girls we’ve got work in the offices and they’re all past their sell by 
date, so I don’t think the parental thing comes into it. I say that but the amount 
of times, we’ve just [opened a new office] and this girl that’s gone down there is 
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going to be a nightmare as an employee because she’s been with us for two 
months, she’s already had a week or two weeks off sick, she didn’t come in 
yesterday or the day before because her daughter was unwell. You start to see a 
pattern, and think there’s going to be a problem. [...] We had one incident when 
one of the reps one day said I’ve got to go to pick the kids up from school and I 
said what about your wife and he replied that she was working, and I told him 
that so was he. I said to him, your wife works part-time doesn’t she? And he said 
yes, so I said whose job’s the breadwinner, whose is more important. He replied 
that she can’t, so I said what are you going to say if I say you can’t. You try to be 
a fair employer. 
The relatively low-status employees expressed a clear view that they were afforded little 
respect or good treatment by the owner-manager. However, dissatisfaction was not 
generally expressed in relation to issues such as child care, perhaps reflecting long 
tenures and a consistent management style. Focused on transactional elements of the 
psychological contract, concerns instead related more to areas such as overtime 
availability and promotion procedures. Matthew, for example, explained: 
… they said they were going to bring in the bonus scheme which they did. I trust 
that if they say something then they will do it. It might take a while but they do 
get around to it. 
  
Owen’s resistance to regulation and his opposition to improved terms and conditions 
were reinforced by his experience of an employment tribunal. He appeared wary of 
employees and concerned that he might face further claims, adjusting his behaviour in 
response to what he perceived as a breach of relational obligations: 
I mean there is one of the reps upstairs who’s worked with me for nearly 13 
years… I always had this habit with this guy to smack him across the head, but it 
was a term of endearment honestly and it was just like ‘get on with it’ in a joke. 
Apparently he got to the stage where he was going to use that against me and he 
knew without any question it was done in fun with him. 
However, Cliff, a manager with long tenure, explained the value of greater formality in 
terms of relieving a pressure to worry about compliance and providing clarity for 
employees: 
Where probably a few years ago, [Owen] would say sack him and then we’d end 
up at a tribunal saying we shouldn’t have sacked him, well now it’s all done by 
the book and they know that on the shop floor so they respond to discipline. If 
I’m going to discipline them then it’s for their own good 
The implementation of such policy, as at InsCo, was supported by documents such as 
handbooks and manuals. Employees signed to confirm they had read the new health and 
safety manual and thereby took personal responsibility, even though many reported not 
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actually reading the manual. 
This lack of engagement with formal policy was despite the dangerous nature of the 
work. Ralph, a machine operator, explained: 
There was one guy who was actually killed in the works last year. [...] he’d got a 
coil of steel, like a toilet roll, which slipped down, and the guy actually got in 
amongst them and he got crushed. That’s difficult, it’s health and safety. I mean 
obviously there has been no real blame proportioned to anybody, it was basically 
his own fault for being daft. […] That caused ructions. 
Cliff explained some of the implications: 
Apart from me and [colleague], no-one, not the Chairman or [Owen] sat and 
talked to them about it and people were low. That’s bad treatment from them. 
Because it was over the Christmas period, there was a gap, but me and 
[colleague] felt that we needed to talk to the staff, we made a point of taking 
them for a drink, having a chat, making sure they was alright. One of them said 
they was never coming back, but every one of them came back.  
The senior management in the firm appeared to view health and safety predominantly in 
terms of their insurance policy and health and safety documents. In contrast, employees, 
who frequently expressed apparently dangerous attitudes to their own safety, perceived 
  
such incidents as a serious breach of the employer’s obligation to maintain their safety, 
irrespective of the specific details of what caused the incident. They certainly did not 
see this obligation as fulfilled by a new policy or by signing the relevant documentation. 
TechCo 
TechCo is a software house which produces specialised software for an increasingly 
saturated niche market and previously strong financial performance over many years 
had deteriorated. Fifteen interviews were carried out at TechCo, from a total of around 
90 employees. Interviews were held with the owner-manager, a senior manager, three 
team leaders, eight technical employees and two administrative staff.  
While the business generally broke even, in some years it had made losses, leading to 
two major restructuring programmes and the company being bought out. The new 
owner, Mark, was more formal and procedure-focused than his predecessor. Increased 
formalisation was regretted and even resented by employees and it was described as at 
odds with the family style of the company. Many staff had long tenure and there was a 
range of transactional and relational obligations perceived by both parties to the 
employment relationship. Several employees spoke of being supported during difficult 
periods outside of work although there were also concerns about a lack of investment in 
training and development. 
Susan, an employee with very long tenure, explained the company’s approach to time 
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off in relation to degrees of informality within the apparently formal policies: 
We do have formal policies but, again, at the end of the day, if somebody goes to 
their manager and their manager, and I’m not saying soft touch, that’s the wrong 
word, is more sympathetic, then they may be able to take half day flexi or time 
off in lieu whereas another manager will say no that contravenes the procedure.  
Social relations at TechCo had been severely disrupted by two rounds of redundancies 
in the previous three years. Power asymmetries were clearly evident throughout these 
processes, despite a mainly graduate workforce theoretically holding some labour 
market power. This had contributed to an ‘us and them’ culture as well as low morale 
described by several employees. 
Development Manager Henry, placing himself with the employees (‘us’), gave a 
representative outline of the employee perspective: 
I think they completely cocked up the first round of redundancies, they treated 
us like commodities, rather than individuals [...] it was completely impersonal 
[…] they basically sent out an e-mail saying in two weeks’ time a group of you 
will be made redundant, and that was it.  
The first, ‘cocked up’ redundancy exercise still survived as an eagerly-told story within 
the organisation, related in terms of an episode of popular sitcom The Office where the 
  
fictional office’s manager announces redundancies in the context of his own promotion. 
However, the owner-manager asserted that these exercises were legislatively compliant 
and some employees perceived the adoption of a scoring system as lending the second 
round some legitimacy. Nigel, a project manager: 
Well, certainly the [second] redundancy process was done very fairly I think. 
The way people were objectively scored, it wasn’t just one person’s opinion. So, 
the exec gave quite a lot of credibility in the redundancy process even though it’s 
very stressful for everybody concerned, at least they had a dependable and fair 
process that they had gone through. 
However, a number of other employees suggested that regulations had been used to 
support a sham selection procedure which justified the selection of those employees 
senior management already wanted to exit. Terry, a developer:  
There was a set of criteria basically, so like what skills a person had, how 
flexible they were, how much this person bought into the company principles 
and so on. I believe they had already targeted who they wanted to get rid of and 
then manipulated the scores. 
Owner-manager Mark explained how the redundancy selection process was used to 
address problems ignored by everyday practices in a business that had been reluctant to 
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use disciplinary procedures to address perceived issues such as excessive sick leave. By 
adopting selection criteria that addressed these areas, staff perceived as problems were 
made redundant. 
Many staff talked about the impact of redundancies on trust. Several mentioned how, 
after being told the first round would not be repeated, the second round was presented 
not in terms of financial necessity but rather as a phase of restructuring. Other 
employees gave detailed examples of specific cases they felt demonstrated either 
insincerity or incompetence in the selection procedure, such as a colleague who had 
been laid off due to high levels of sick leave following a miscarriage. It was suggested 
that the employer had a relational obligation to consider such circumstances alongside 
the more formal selection criteria. Therefore, even if minimally compliant with 
regulation, this second exercise was seen by some as a breach of the relational 
psychological contract. 
In the context of the redundancy exercise there was very little acknowledgement from 
senior management of a relational psychological contract or any rights or obligations 
that might be associated with it. Instead they focused on minimal compliance and, given 
the financial struggles of the firm, ensuring the best outcome for firm performance. 
Discussion 
The effects of regulation can be dynamic and indirect (Kitching et al., 2013a) and so are 
  
complex and difficult to understand. This has important implications, not only for 
individual firms but for broader debates around the ‘burdens’ of regulation (Carter et al., 
2009; Edwards et al., 2004). Our research analyses employment relationships within 
medium-sized enterprises to examine how the regulatory context might be interpreted, 
enacted, ignored and negotiated. These are firms that retain owner-manager centrality 
and a degree of informality but have formalised and, in theory, have more sophisticated 
policies and practices with which to engage with regulation than more informal small 
enterprises (Carter et al., 2009). The psychological contract provides a valuable way of 
conceptualising the interplay of these informal and formal influences within the 
employment relationship, capturing important perceptions of rights and obligations that 
fall outside of the formal contract. 
Medium-sized firms represent an interesting case, retaining a history of informal 
negotiation in the context of more formal systems that, in our firms, were established in 
part to ensure greater regulatory compliance and protection from employment tribunals. 
Within our research, examples manifested in the staff handbook at InsCo, health and 
safety at SteelCo and selection criteria for a redundancy exercise at TechCo. The owner-
managers of all three firms relied, to varying degrees, on external consultants and 
expressed the security they felt this helped provide in managing the employment 
relationship and protecting them from the perceived dangers of employment regulation. 
However, the formal policies and practices that represented regulation within the firms 
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did not only operate in these relatively direct ways. We suggest that the dynamic, 
indirect effects of regulation can be valuably understood through the ways in which the 
development and negotiation of perceived rights and obligations draw upon formal and 
informal elements of the organisation and the interplay between them. 
Despite high degrees of formality, informal practices pervaded the firms and were often 
preferred to formal procedures. Through this preference for informality, even 
compliance with regulations served less to remove management prerogative than to 
reposition its application. Examples of this arose in all three firms, despite their 
differences in employee status and education, financial performance and management 
style. For example, at TechCo, while some staff perceived formal selection criteria as 
lending the redundancy process some legitimacy, others argued that management had, in 
complying with regulations, constructed the criteria in such a way as to target those staff 
they deemed problematic and, to a degree, this was supported by senior management 
accounts. The exercise of informal management prerogative in this example had moved 
from being exercised explicitly in selecting particular employees for redundancy, to 
application earlier in the redundancy process when formulating the criteria required, 
achieving management designs. 
Where the relationship was held to be compliant with appropriate employment 
regulations, management interpreted this as fulfilling the sum of their obligations with 
  
respect to staff. At SteelCo, this related even to extreme incidences of health and safety 
as well as in providing protection and guidance for the owner-manager’s brash 
management style. At InsCo, more harmonious, informal employment relations were 
apparent, with owner-manager Fred suggesting that employment regulations were 
largely irrelevant and ‘30 years behind good business practice’. However, formal 
documentation still contained only those rights and obligations relating to minimal 
compliance, operating on a similar principle to that at SteelCo.  
The coexistence of informality and formality within medium-sized firms (Marlow, 
2003; Marlow et al., 2010) can be seen in these examples through their informing the 
perceptions of rights and obligations that draw upon the interplay between informal 
negotiation and formally recorded policies. Managers interpreted any provisions that 
went beyond what they understood to be their minimal obligations, such as with paid 
periods of absence at InsCo, as bonuses granted (or withheld) at their discretion. Thus, 
the formal documentation was used to negotiate employee compliance in such a way 
that there was relatively little fear of breach of the psychological contract. Owner-
managers did not feel that these individual bonuses constituted improved rights or 
created obligations beyond each specific application. Rather, they broadly felt bound 
only by what was formally set out and that for which they could be clearly and 
explicitly held accountable, not through direct reference to regulation.  
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The repositioning of owner-manager prerogative was compounded since, where 
formality represented external regulation, within all three firms this was taken by 
employees as an unproblematic translation, that a staff handbook or policy accurately 
represented their rights and obligations. Thus, employees, focused on their perceptions 
of a psychological contract, effectively ignored the regulation itself, their 
(mis)understanding mediated by their interaction with the formally produced 
documents. Employers were not held accountable to the regulation but to its mediated 
form within the organisation. This led to dynamic, indirect and unpredictable effects, 
such as an informal bonus system for time-off at InsCo, new forms of ‘by the book’ 
discipline at SteelCo or the revised basis of redundancies at TechCo. Many of these 
effects appeared to be accepted by a majority of employees across all three firms, 
irrespective of their level of education, pay or status. As a result, employment regulation 
was not guaranteed to have its desired impacts and owner-managers were rarely 
burdened beyond the expense of their legal advisors, their informal prerogative largely 
still governing these firms. 
Despite an owner-manager expressing concern that, once a practice was formally 
recorded in the staff handbook, management could find their discretion constrained, the 
impact of formal policies in constraining management prerogative can be over-stated. In 
each of the firms it was management, advised by their specialists, who decided what 
went into the formal documents. This more informal owner-manager prerogative grants 
  
them some discretion over what rights are highlighted to employees and, where 
possible, allows owner-managers to shape policies that, while ensuring minimal 
regulatory compliance, maintain their discretion and suit their personal preferences. 
Furthermore, once a policy is formalised, owner-manager prerogative becomes reified 
and separated from its source, forming part of the rules on which the company operates 
and influencing the perceived psychological contract. As such, employees found it hard 
to negotiate around formal policy because it is the preserve of management, including 
the discretion to effect alterations, as suggested at InsCo. 
The interplay between informality and formality provides a form of negotiation which 
alters the ways in which regulation dynamically and indirectly influences the 
employment relationship with effects and outcomes that are difficult to foresee. This can 
be theoretically understood in terms of the development and negotiation of perceptions 
of the psychological contract in terms of perceived rights and obligations. For both 
employers and employees, this draws upon both informal and formal sources and is 
negotiated on an ongoing, everyday basis. Regulation does not necessarily remove 
informality, owner-manager prerogative or the role of perceived rights and obligations, 
although it does influence them and how they are exercised. 
Conclusion 
Set within the context of a dominant political narrative of enterprise and business 
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growth, employment regulation is often presented as a particular problem for SMEs. 
However, despite this popular perception of ‘the effect’ of regulation, research has 
begun to indicate a more complex scenario, with regulation having dynamic, indirect 
effects on firms (Edwards et al., 2004; Kitching et al., 2013a). This article has explored 
these issues with reference to employment relationships in medium-sized firms. It 
suggests that some of these dynamic, indirect effects can be understood in terms of the 
psychological contract which helps to conceptualise the interplay of the formal and 
informal elements of the employment relationship as regards the development and 
negotiation of perceived rights and obligations. 
Our findings contribute to a growing understanding of regulation in medium-sized 
firms. Through a focus on employment regulation, we have identified a range of both 
formal and informal processes that, through their interplay, altered the dynamic, indirect 
effects of regulation within the firms. Formal policy documents and procedures were 
not predominantly seen by owner-managers as representing (best) practices within their 
firms, potentially limiting the reliability of studies gathering information only in terms 
of these policies. Where these formal documents were influential was in shaping the 
psychological contract, albeit through informal processes of second-hand reports, 
management interactions and personal experiences, reflecting the firms as informal, 
storytelling organisations as much as policy-led, formal operations. In each firm the 
ways in which regulation was interpreted, enacted, ignored and negotiated therefore 
  
produced a variety of unpredictable interactions between the formal policies and the 
informality associated with owner-manager prerogative and employee negotiation. 
This conceptually develops the psychological contract in the specific context of 
medium-sized firms, which allows us to better understand dynamic, indirect effects of 
regulation. Employees lacked the ability to enter full negotiations of rights and 
obligations around the repositioned areas of informality and owner-manager decision 
making. This was explained by a lack of knowledge and a tendency to regard formal 
policies and procedures as representing external regulations unproblematically. What 
they perceived as their rights and obligations, and where they perceived forms of breach 
or failure on the part of employers, can therefore be usefully conceptualised in relation 
to a psychological contract that embraces the formal and informal, direct and indirect 
influences of regulation within the employment relationship. 
There are several limitations with this type of qualitative, exploratory study. While 
studying firms from different sectors allowed us to broaden the scope of our research, 
for example in terms of employee education and status, it also limited the degree of 
between-firm comparison. Employees in the participating firms, especially those of 
lower status and education level, may not articulate their full understanding or might be 
alienated by engaging in terms of a psychological contract (Dick and Nadin, 2011). 
Further, having conducted in-depth research in only three firms, the results are not 
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broadly generalisable, providing instead interpretive insights and avenues for further 
research. Future research should seek to further develop our understanding of how the 
interplay between informality and formality influences the psychological contract and, 
beyond this, to seek further generalisation of the dynamic, indirect effects that 
regulation can produce within SMEs. 
For policy-makers, it seems clear that rights and obligations need to be communicated 
more clearly and directly to employees. However, this alone may not help redefine 
perceived psychological contracts that had few reference points outside of the firm 
beyond owner-managers’ legal advisors and dominant neo-liberal and managerialist 
discourses. This suggests some of the complexities and nuance in the role of the 
psychological contract in SMEs. 
Our study has discussed, through empirical examples, how the interplay between 
informality and formality informs an ongoing negotiation within the employment 
relationship that alters the dynamic, indirect effects of regulation. We suggest that, 
theoretically, this can be understood through the development and negotiation of 
perceptions of the psychological contract which, for both employers and employees, 
draws upon informal and formal sources and is negotiated on an ongoing, everyday 
basis. These insights suggest why, in practice, the claimed burdens on employers of 
regulation may be exaggerated and, moreover, that regulation must speak to the 
  
psychological, as well as the formal written contract if it is to be effective in SMEs. 
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